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SELLER'S RECOVERY OF OVERHEAD UNDER
UCC SECTION 2-708(2): ECONOMIC COST
THEORY AND CONTRACT
REMEDIAL POLICY*
Richard E. Speidel t and Kendall 0. Clay#
The law of contract liability and remedy has traditionally emerged
from judicial decisions of disputes arising when exchange transactions
break down. Since bargain and exchange are the grist of our market
system, it is not surprising that these decisions are concerned with how
bargainers ought to behave, and often rest upon unarticulated assump-
tions about what is good for a free enterprise market economy. The
decision model frequently assumes a market which is purely competi-
tive, that is, where demand is the equivalent of price and where bar-
gainers are informed, experienced, relatively balanced in strategic and
economic resources,' and responsive to judicial decisions about liability
and remedy. Under this model, contract law should facilitate the efforts
of private bargainers to enter and complete agreed exchanges and to
* The authors wish to express their thanks to Professor Thomas Bergin of the Uni-
versity of Virginia for his helpful comments on different drafts of this paper. We also
profited from reading a paper on the economics of consumer credit reform by Professor
George Wallace of the University of Iowa College of Law. Finally, we have been instructed
through discussions with our teachers and colleagues at the University of Virginia who
attended the "economics for lawyers" program, under the direction of Professor Henry
Manne, at the University of Rochester in the summer of 1971. They have helped us to
internalize our externalities. Or is it the other way around?
t* Doherty Professor of Law, University of Virginia. BA. 1954, Denison University;
J.D. 1957, University of Cincinnati; LL.M. 1958, Northwestern University.
ff B.S. 1966, M.A. 1968, Virginia Polytechnic Institute; J.D. 1972, University of Vir-
ginia.
1 "The traditional contract is the result of free bargaining of parties who are brought
together by the play of the market, and who meet each other on a footing of approximate
economic equality." Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 389, 161 A.2d 69,
86 (1959).
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obtain adequate remedies when things go wrong.2 When, in a particular
dispute, the model does not conform to reality, one of the parties must
prove it and invoke an exception to normal operating principles. 3
If liability is established4 and the dispute is not settled thereafter,
the court must confront the problem of adequate remedies. Questions
of liability, however, cannot entirely be separated from questions of
remedy. The reasons assigned for liability, whether to protect the
"'reasonable expectations" of the parties and thus the security of trans-
actions or justifiable reliance or to prevent unjust enrichment, give
content to the remedy and frame the outer limits of recovery. One must
know why promises are enforced before the question of "how much"
can be resolved.3 This is another way of saying that the content of
2 For a good discussion of the "market support" role of contract law, see Macaulay,
Private Legislation and the Duty to Read-Business Run by IBM Machine, the Law of
Contracts and Credit Cards, 19 VANm. L. REv. 1051, 1055-69 (1966). For various approaches
to the "support" function, see Carroll, Harpooning Whales, of Which Karl N. Llewellyn is
the Hero of the Piece: Or Searching For More Expansion Joints in Karl's Crumbling
Cathedral, 12 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 139 (1970); Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and
Traditional Contract Law, 78 YALE L.J. 343 (1969); Summers, "Good Faith" in General
Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv.
195 (1968); Summers, The Technique Element in Law, 59 CALIF. L. R v. 733, 741-45 (1971).
3 In addition to the usual exceptions of mistake, fraud, and undue influence or
duress, the doctrine of unconscionability, arising from direct or analogical application of
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-302, has provided further protection against abuse in the
bargaining process. For an important case which also cites the relevant literature, see
Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 279 A.2d 640 (1971).
Changes in economic and social structure and in patterns of business in this country
signal both the breakdown of the traditional market support role played by courts and
increased regulation of market transactions through legislative and administrative pro-
cesses. These changes are traced and assessed in L. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA:
A SoCIAL AND ECoNoMc CASE STUDY (1965). For variations on the "return to status from
contract" theme, see Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 Amr. U.L. REv. 131 (1970); Rehbinder,
Status, Contract and the Welfare State, 23 STAN. L. REV. 941 (1971); Slawson, Standard
Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Law Making Power, 84 HA~v. L. REv. 529
(1971); Smith, Accountability and Independence in the Contract State, in THE DILEMMA
OF AccouNTAnusrrI IN MODERN GOVERNMENT 3-69 (B. Smith & D. Hague eds. 1971).
4 The scope and complexity of contemporary liability issues, for example whether a
particular agreement is commercially unreasonable, are strikingly illustrated in In re
Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864, 874-75 (E.D. Pa. 1966). See Speidel, Unconscionabil-
ity, Assent and Consumer Protection, 31 U. PITT. L. REv. 359, 367-74 (1970). The opportu-
nity for decisions which are more responsive to commercial needs and practices must be
balanced against the costs in time, resources, and certainty of particularized inquiry.
According to Professor Stewart Macaulay, when the standards for decision require an
emphasis upon "particular nuances," the "chance of winning... can influence the settle-
ment negotiation process, and all 'legal rights' then have to be discounted by this factor."
Macaulay, supra note 2, at 1066.
5 A contemporary illustration is the issue of the appropriate remedy when promissory
liability is predicated upon induced but unbargained for reliance. See Hoffman v. Red
Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
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contract remedies should be strongly influenced by the reasons given
for enforcing promises. Whether the policies implicit in decisions about
liability are achieved, therefore, depends upon both the purposes of
contract remedies and the effectiveness of the legal system in imple-
menting them.
I
PURPOSE AND EFFICIENCY IN CONTRACT REMEDIES
As one might expect, there has been considerable discussion about
the purposes of contract remedies. Professor Arthur Corbin suggested
that one purpose is to prevent breaches of contract:
[iJhat damages must be paid tends directly to the prevention of
breaches of contract. It makes, therefore, for the security of business
transactions and helps to make possible the vast structure of credit,
upon which so large a part of our modern philosophy depends.6
Corbin thus advanced a theory of general deterrence. Unlike the crim-
inal law,7 however, "that damages must be paid" is not designed to
reduce to zero the attractiveness of the possible gain through breach
of contract. Since breach of contract is almost never a crime, since
punitive or exemplary damages are rarely awarded, and since specific
performance is an exception rather than the rule, the compulsive or
punitive aspects of contract remedies are minimized." Thus the prospect
of liability for damages is simply one factor that the promisor considers
when calculating whether losses through breach are likely to exceed
the gains from reallocating resources to new bargains.
Some have doubted the impact of this factor,9 while others ap-
TRACTS § 90 (rent. Draft No. 2, 1965) (remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice
requires); Comment, Once More into the Breach: Promissory Estoppel and Traditional
Damage Doctrine, 37 U. Cm. L. Rrv. 559 (1970). See also Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance
Interest in Contract Damages (pts. 1 & 2), 46 YALE L.J. 52, 373 (1936-1937); Henderson,
Promises Grounded in the Past: The Idea of Unjust Enrichment and the Law of Contracts,
57 VA. L. REv. 1115 (1971).
6 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRAcrS § 1002, at 34 (rev. ed. 1964).
7 See H. PAcKER, TrE Limrrs OF Ta CRIMINAL SANCTION 41 (1968). See also F. ZIMRING,
PERsPEcrIVs ON DErTERRaNc (1971); Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punish-
ment, 114 U. PA. L. Rav. 949 (1966); Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 401, 404-06 (1958); Griffiths, Book Review, 79 YALE L.J. 1388 (1971).
8 This point is .well made in Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70
COLuJm. L. RFv. 1145, 114647, 1149-60 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Farnsworth]. See also
Ball & Friedman, The Use of Criminal Sanctions in the Enforcement of Economic Legisla-
tion: A Sociological View, 17 STAN. L. Rv. 197 (1965); Rice, Exemplary Damages in Private
Consumer Actions, 55 IowA L. Rav. 307, 308-19 (1969).
9 But even in the simple cases where the gamble both of establishing breach and
1972]
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parently reject deterrence as an important purpose of contract remedies.
Professor Allan Farnsworth, for example, has concluded that our
remedial system is not "directed at compulsion of promisors to prevent
breach" but rather at "relief to promisees to redress breach." The ques-
tion is not how to encourage men to keep promises; rather it is, "How
can men be encouraged to deal with those who make promises?" The
answer is, "By protecting their expectations in the event of breach."'10
From this perspective the primary purpose of contractual remedies is
compensation, not deterrence.
The litany of compensation for breach of contract is well known
to every first year law student. The primary objective of contract dam-
ages is "to put the injured party in as good a position as that in which
he would have been put by full performance."" In short, the plaintiff
may recover the value of the defendant's promised performance. In
general, this includes any loss resulting in the ordinary course of events
from the breach. More precisely, damages will be given "for the net
amount of the losses caused and gains prevented by the defendant's
breach in excess of the savings made possible."' 2 Translated into market
terms, the plaintiff may recover his investment made in the bargain
(reliance) and the net gain prevented by the breach (expectation).13
of making proof of full indemnifiable loss is reduced to a minimum, it is an open
secret that a contract breaker rarely stands to lose as much by his breach as he
would by performance. And the more deliberate the breach, the more apt he is to
gain.
Mueller, Contract Remedies: Business Fact and Legal Fantasy, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 833, 835.
See Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 Am. Socio-
LOGICAL REV. 55 (1963), where the author concludes that in many business exchanges the
role of legal sanctions is small. Various nonlegal sanctions may of course deter breach
where continuing exchange relationships are involved.
10 Farnsworth 1147.
11 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 329, comment a (1933); accord, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 1-106(l) [hereinafter cited as UCC]; Abrams v. Reynolds Metals Co., 340 Mass. 704,
166 N.E.2d 204 (1960). The goal, then, is "not the mere restoration to a former position, as
in tort, but the awarding of a sum which is the equivalent of performance of the bargain."
C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF DAmAGEs 561 (1935). The reasons for this policy
are the need to protect what Professor Lon Fuller has called the promisee's "hidden
reliance"--his lost opportunity costs (Fuller & Perdue, supra note 5, at 57-66), and the need
to support the market as a working institution. See Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Dam-
age Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 24 RufGmEs L. Ray. 273 (1970); Hartzler, The
Business and Economic Functions of the Law of Contract Damages, 6 AM. Bus. L.J. 387,
388-97 (1968).
12 RESTATEMENT OF Comncrs § 329 (1933). See A.R.A. Mfg. Co. v. Pierce, 86 Ariz. 136,
341 P.2d 928 (1959).
13 This recovery is well illustrated in construction contracts when the owner repudi-
ates while the builder is in mid-performance. The contractor usually may recover an
amount represented by the contract price less the estimated cost to complete the job. His
recovery includes the profit that he would have earned by full performance and the per-
[Vol. 57:681
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The apparent simplicity of the litany is belied by a number of "rea-
sonable" limitations upon the scope of recovery and by the difficulties
inherent in applying rubrics to particular cases. First, the plaintiff can-
not recover any loss which at the time of contracting was not reasonably
foreseeable by the defendant as the probable result of breach. Hadley
v. Baxendale14 still lives. Second, upon the defendant's breach the plain-
tiff must take reasonable steps to avoid the consequences of that breach;
the plaintiff has a duty to mitigate his damages. 15 Third, if the plaintiff
has decided to litigate and has selected an appropriate remedy, problems
of proof remain. In addition to proving that the breach caused the loss
complained of,16 the plaintiff must establish his loss with reasonable
certainty-a difficult task when formulas measuring loss by the differ-
ence between contract and market price are not applicable.17 Although
it is usually stated that the defendant has the burden of proving the
plaintiff's failure to mitigate damages,'8 his actual burden may often be
difficult to predict, the matter being complicated by the complexity of
the issues as well as by a limited access to sources of proof.19 As the archi-
tects of the first Restatement of Contracts conceded, the difficulties in-
volved in measuring loss frequently foreclose the attainment of remedial
formance expenditures actually incurred up to the time of repudiation. See, e.g., Peter
Kiewit Sons' Co. v. Summit Constr. Co., 422 F.2d 242, 260-64 (8th Cir. 1969); M. & R. Con-
tractors & Builders, Inc. v. Michael, 215 Md. 340, 138 A.2d 350 (1958); Patterson, Builder's
Measure of Recovery for Breach of Contract, 31 CoLum. L. REV. 1286 (1931). For a full
discussion of the limitations and difficulties of this approach, see Farnsworth 1160-75.
14 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854). The expansion and contraction of this doctrine in
England is illustrated in Victoria Laundry (Windsor) LD v. Newman Indus. LD, [1949] 2
K.B. 528 (CA.) (expansion), and The Heron II (Koufos v. C. Czarnikow, LTD.), [1967] 3
All E. R. 686 (H.L.) (contraction). A recent "hardline" American decision is Keystone
Diesel Engine Co. v. Irvin, 411 Pa. 222, 191 A.2d 376 (1963). See UCC § 2-715(2); RESTATE-
MENT oF CoNTRAcrs § 330 (1933); Farnsworth 1199-1210.
15 See Farnsworth 1183-1199.
16 Some courts have stated that the breach must be a substantial factor in bringing
about the loss. E.g., Krauss v. Greenbarg, 137 F.2d 569, 571-72 (3d Cir. 1943), cert. denied,
320 US. 791 (1944); see F.M.C. Corp. v. Strebeck, 196 So. 2d 74 (Miss. 1967).
17 See Farmers Cooperative Ass'n v. Phillips, 241 Ark. 28, 405 S.W.2d 939 (1966); Val-
ley Die Cast Corp. v. A.C.W., Inc., 25 Mich. App. 821, 181 N.W.2d 303, 310 (1970); R-
STATE.ENT OF CONTRACas § 331 (1933); C. McCo MICK, supra note 11, §§ 25-32; Comment,
Lost Profits as Contract Damages: Problems of Proof and Limitations on Recovery, 65 YALE
L.J. 992 (1956). Recent cases have refused to deny recovery simply because the elements of
alleged lost profits were complex and somewhat speculative. See Locke v. United States,
283 F.2d 521, 524-25 (Ct. Cl. 1960); Air Technology Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 347 Mass.
613, 199 N.E.2d 538 (1964).
18 E.g., Holland v. Green Mountain Swim Club, Inc., 470 P.2d 61, 63 (Colo. App. 1970).
39 See, e.g., Liberty Navigation & Trading Co. v. Knoshita & Co., 285 F.2d 343 (2d Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 866 US. 949 (1961); Apex Metal Stamping Co. v. Alexander & Sawyer,
Inc., 48 N.J. Super. 476, 138 A.2d 568 (App. Div. 1958); Allen, Heaton & McDonald, Inc. v.
Castle Farm Amusement Co., 151 Ohio St. 522, 86 N.E.2d 782 (1949).
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purposes "with any near approach to exactness. ' 20 The cumulative ef-
fect of the limitations upon recovery tends to favor the contract
breacher. As Farnsworth has remarked, "All in all, our system of legal
remedies for breach of contract, heavily influenced by the economic
philosophy of free enterprise, has shown a marked solicitude for men
who do not keep their promises." '21
The extent to which this solicitude tends to discourage dealings
with those who make promises or to induce aggrieved parties to pursue
questionable nonlegal sanctions when breach occurs is a matter of con-
jecture. Nevertheless, the suggestion that the quantum of contract
remedies is inadequate when measured against the stated purpose of
compensation is distressing. The views of some economists on the free-
dom to breach a contract further complicate the problem.22 According
to Professor Robert Birmingham, a lawyer-economist, contract remedies
should encourage rather than discourage breach of contract when the
defendant can gain from the reallocation of resources and the plaintiff
is fully reimbursed for his lost bargain and any transaction costs in-
curred.23 This approach explicitly rejects transactional security as the
ultimate policy objective, the notion that a deliberate, calculated
breach should be penalized, and the thesis that the defendant should
be made to account to the plaintiff for any net gains realized through
breach. 24 It is justified by a concept of economic efficiency that would
encourage the "optimal reallocation of factors of production and goods
without causing material instability of expectations '25 and would permit
the bound party confronted with a more attractive opportunity
to buy his freedom by offering to share his gain with the promisee.
Thus the deterrent effect of potential damage liability depends upon a
20 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 329, comment a (1983). On the other hand, it has
been stated that any damage formula is "improvidently invoked if it defeats a common
sense solution" (525 Main St. Corp. v. Eagle Roofing Co., 84 N.J. 251, 254, 168 A.2d 33, 4
(1961)) and that fairness to the litigants is the "ultimate test of the correctness of an
award" (id. at 258, 168 A.2d at 36).
21 Farnsworth 1216.
22 In this setting, the question is how much restraint is likely to be imposed, not
whether the breach is right or wrong. The probability of "protective reaction" as opposed
to the morality of breach-this is the "empirical" scope of freedom. See Oppenheim, Free-
dom-An Empirical Interpretation, in Nomos IV: LiBETY 274-88 (C. Friedrich ed. 1962).
23 Birmingham, supra note 11. While "transaction costs" are not clearly defined, they
apparently include all post-breach costs that would be incurred in pursuing a claim to
payment or a satisfied judgment. See Leff, Injury, Ignorance and Spite-The Dynamics of
Coercive Collection, 80 YALE L.J. 1, 5-26 (1970); cf. UCC § 2-710.
24 The most forceful argument in favor of disgorging the net gain is made in Dawson,
Restitution or Damages?, 20 Onto ST. LJ. 175 (1959).
25 Birmingham, supra note 11, at 292.
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cold, economic calculus unlaced from the morality of promise keeping
or the policy of transactional security.
The dilemma is clearly posed. Nonlegal pressures aside, the greater
the prospect of quick and adequate recovery by the plaintiff, the less
likely it is that nonperformance will be considered worthwhile by the
promisor. If the promisor, however, can improve his economic position
by breach and if the promisee, because of an inadequate quantum of
recovery or excessively high transactions costs, is not likely to seek or
to obtain full compensation for his loss, the search for economic effici-
ency is confused by a problem of distributive justice. Whether one
views the ultimate purpose of contract remedies as encouraging dealings
with those who make promises or encouraging economic efficiency, the
achievement of either depends upon an adequate quantum of remedy
and the effectiveness of the remedial system.
Quite apart from the factors that may influence an individual deci-
sion to sue,28 the effectiveness of our remedial system, always difficult
to measure, turns on a variety of systemic considerations. Involved in
almost every civil dispute are the availability of self-help remedies, the
incentives and capacity of the aggrieved party, accessibility to forums
other than courts, the cost and delay of litigation, the quality of the
trial court, and enforcement problems once a judgment is obtained.27
More closely related to this article is the problem of proving damages
caused by breach. Depending upon the choice of standards for mea-
suring loss, the allocation of burdens of proof, the quantity and com-
plexity of the evidence, and the receptiveness of the court to efforts by
the parties to liquidate damages in advance of breach, the plaintiff may
face even more obstacles on the road to a satisfied judgment. In short,
both the costs of using the legal system and the difficulty of establishing
the amount of loss are critical factors in the decision whether to sue.28
Against this backdrop we shall try to demonstrate, through the use
of economic cost theory, a more exact way to measure loss in a commer-
26 See, e.g., H. HAVIGHURST, THE NATURE OF PRIvATE CONTRACt 63-86 (1961).
27 This general problem is well discussed in L. FRIEMAN, supra note 3, at 198-215.
28 Professor Arthur Leff calls such considerations the cost of due process, which is
high for four reasons:
First, due process demands that at the outset the court and its officers be wholly
ignorant of what happened and it is expensive to educate them .... Second, the
process of education cannot proceed on a generalized (mass-produced) basis; each
case is theoretically hand-crafted. Third, save in a court of small claims it is usu-
ally specialists (e.g., lawyers) who do the crafting. Fourth, because the courts do
not allocate docket space by competitive bidding between plaintiffs, the creditor
with the largest claim at stake must take his place in a "queue" behind plaintiffs
with smaller claims.
Leff, supra note 23, at 8.
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cial transaction between professional businessmen. First, we shall pre-
sent a fact situation involving a contract for the sale of manufactured
goods which has been repudiated by the buyer before performance is
completed. Second, assuming that the seller has properly stopped per-
formance, we shall ascertain what damages the seller could recover
under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The recoverability of
overhead as damages will be emphasized. Third, we shall apply eco-
nomic cost theory to the same problem and compare our results with
those obtained under the legal analysis. Finally, we shall evaluate the
differences in recovery in light of the purpose and effectiveness of con-
tract remedies and on the basis of this evaluation propose an appropri-
ate interpretation of the relevant UCC provisions.
II
SELLER'S RECOVERY OF OVERHEAD: LEGAL ANALYsis
A. The Business Setting
Spartin Company manufactures paper products for computer oper-
ations, including data cards, print-out paper, and teletype ribbon. A
single product firm, Spartin operates under an absorption or full cost-
ing accounting system.29 In 1971 its annual sales were $500,000 and its
net profit after recovery of all fixed and variable costs was $125,000.
During this period, Spartin's fixed capacity costs-its manufacturing
overhead including executive salaries, labor, insurance, and plant sup-
port-totalled $50,000.30
29 Under this system, (also called job order costing), a production lot is defined, the
direct labor and material costs (variable) traceable to that lot are identified, a portion of
the non-traceable (fixed) overhead expenses is added, and the total amount is divided by
the number of product units in the lot. This system is used to measure the cost of goods
sold, to measure inventories, and to facilitate external financial reporting. Under an
alternative system, called variable or direct costing, unit cost is defined as the average vari-
able cost of manufacturing the product. Fixed overhead costs are excluded. Although this
system is not recommended for external financial reporting, it arguably provides better
data for managerial decisions and evaluations. See I. KELLR. & W. FERAR, MANAGEMENT
AccOuNTING FOR PROFIT CONTROL 688-724 (2d ed. 1966); G. SMLLINGLAW, CosT AccouNriNG:
ANALYsIs AND CONTROL 79-93, 177, 189-95, 197-98 (rev. ed. 1967). To simplify analysis,
Spartin has more or less arbitrarily been classified as a single product firm.
30 Assume that Spartin's "production lot" is its estimated capacity to produce during
one year and that the Blippo contract is one product unit. Manufacturing overhead here
includes those costs that either are not or cannot be traced to the Blippo contract. They
are common costs incurred to support the "production lot" and are not necessarily propor-
tional to the volume of production activity. Manufacturing overhead consists of costs that
do not vary in proportion to short run changes in production volume. G. SMLLINGLAW,
supra note 29, at 373.
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In January 1972, Spartin negotiated a contract with Blippo, Inc.
for the manufacture and sale of graphite impregnated data cards for a
fixed price of $50,000. Delivery was promised in installments over a
twelve-month period. At the time of contracting, Spartin's job cost
figures looked like this:
(1) Variable costs
(a) estimated materials required
for manufacturing $22,500
(b) one new skilled employee, hired
for one year $10,000
(2) Fixed overhead allocated to the
contract on the basis of predetermined
burden rates31  $ 5,000
(3) Estimated net profit on the job $12,500
Total: $50,000
By February 1, 1970, Spartin had purchased for $5,000 the graphite re-
quired for the contract and hired the new employee for $10,000 on a
one-year contract. On February 5, before any other expenditures and
before any deliveries or payments were made, Blippo communicated
a deliberate and unexcused repudiation to Spartin. After some discus-
sion, it became clear that Blippo would not retract the repudiation.
B. Recovery Under the UCC
Since Blippo repudiated a contract for the sale of specially manu-
factured goods, remedial questions are governed by article 2 of the
UCC.32 Under section 2-704(2), whether Spartin should complete per-
formance or stop work will depend upon "the exercise of reasonable
commercial judgment for the purposes of avoiding loss and of effective
realization." Presumably it would be commercially reasonable for Spar-
31 Allocation of fixed overhead to particular jobs is necessary to price goods so as to
recover these costs. Although any allocation is more or less arbitrary and its accuracy
dependent upon relative volume, stability difficulties are eased by predetermining burden
rates from cost averages in normal periods of operation. See id. at 82-83, 207-222, 687-689;
cf. Vitex Mfg. Corp. v. Caribtex Corp., 377 F.2d 795, 798 (3d Cir. 1967) (prorata allocation
is an analytical construct not normally bearing direct relationship to any individual trans-
action). There is no single phase of determining the cost of manufacturing more elusive or
difficult to measure than the allocation of overhead to a particular contract. See Gordon
Form Lathe Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 133 F.2d 487, 500 (6th Cir.), aff'd, 320 U.S. 714 (1943).
The allocation process is a matter frequently disputed in government contracts (e.g.,
Peninsular Chemresearch, Inc., A.S.B.C.A. No. 14383, 71-2 CCH BD. Corr. App. DEc.
9066 (Aug. 30, 1971) and sometimes poses antitrust questions. See Schwartz, Mandatory
Patent Licensing of Air Pollution Control Technology, 57 VA. L. REy. 719, 727-36 (1971)
(price discrimination).
32 See UCC §§ 2-102, 2-105(l), 2-703.
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tin to cancel the contract, cease manufacture, resell any unusable ma-
terials for scrap or salvage value, and seek damagesA3
What would these damages be? Assume that Spartin has excess
capacity-that is, that Spartin could have satisfied additional demand
for a similar product even though Blippo had not repudiated. Spartin
would therefore have no duty to mitigate damages by reallocating to
another job the productive capacity released by the breach,34 but it
would be required to make reasonable efforts to salvage or reallocate
the specific labor and materials already obtained for the job. Let us
further assume that (1) the $5,000 supply of graphite cannot reasonably
be reallocated or resold within the foreseeable future and (2) the new
employee hired at $10,000 a year is reassigned for the balance of his con-
tract, without a decrease in pay, to a recently vacant job paying $6,000
per year. Therefore, of the $15,000 in variable costs incurred before the
breach, $6,000 can be avoided by transferring the employee, but $9,000
is not salvageable. All things being equal, Spartin should at the very
least recover this amount from Blippo.35
33 Since Blippo did not retract the repudiation (id. § 2-611(1)), Spartin can resort to
the remedies made available in § 2-703, one of which is cancellation (id. § 2-610(b)). In
most cases it would be reasonable and perhaps necessary to stop work and to salvage. See
Farnsworth 1184-85. After repudiation, however, the seller might arrange a resale contract
with a third party, complete and deliver the goods in process, and seek damages based
upon the difference between the original contract price and the resale price under §
2-706(1). Id. §§ 2-704(l)(b), 2-706(2). The damages resulting from such a course of action
are likely to be less than if the seller stopped work and sued under § 2-708(2). See Buchman
v. Millville Mfg. Co., 17 F.2d 983 (2d Cir. 1937). The commercial reasonableness of a deci-
sion to complete manufacture of special goods without a resale contract, however, might
be subject to question. If after completion a resale could not reasonably be completed, the
appropriate remedy would be an action for the price which, if successful, would increase
rather than mitigate the buyer's liability. UCC § 2-709(l)(b).
34 See, e.g., Locks v. Wade, 36 N.J. Super. 128, 114 A.2d 875 (App. Div. 1955); Harris,
A Radical Restatement of the Law of Seller's Damages: Sales Act and Commercial Code
Results Compared, 18 STAz. L. Ray. 66, 80-83 (1965). But see- Crane Iron Works v. Cox &
Sons, 28 F.2d 328 (3d Cir. 1928); 38 YALE LJ. 676 (1929).
35 A leading pre-Code case is Perfecting Serv. Co. v. Product Dev. & Sales Co., 259
N.C. 400, 415-17, 131 S.E.2d 9, 21-22 (1963), where the court stated that, subject to a duty
to mitigate damages by reasonable salvage efforts, the seller could recover at a minimum
the reasonable expenditures for labor and materials to the extent wasted when performance
was stopped. See Madrigale v. Corrone, 5 Conn. Cir. 521, 527-28, 258 A.2d 102, 105-06
(Circ. Ct. App. Div. 1968); Apex Metal Stamping Co. v. Alexander & Sawyer, Inc., 48 NJ.
Super. 476, 138 A.2d 568 (App. Div. 1958); Comment, A Suggested Revision of the Contract
Doctrine of Anticipatory Repudiation, 64 YALE L.J. 85, 105-09 (1954). Under the Code, the
matter is less than dear. See Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale
of Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article Two, 73 YALE L.J.
199, 273-75 (1963). Assuming that § 2-708(2) applies, the same result can be achieved by
reading "due allowance for costs reasonably incurred" to protect reliance expenditures,
and by invoking § 2-704(2) to handle the mitigation problem. See Harris, supra note 34, at
102-04. In addition to consistency with pre-Code law, this approach finds strong support
SELLER'S RECOVERY OF OVERHEAD
What about lost profits? At common law and under section 64(4)
of the Uniform Sales Act, courts agreed that lost profits of a seller in
Spartin's position were not to be measured by the difference between
the contract price and the market price at the time and place of de-
livery. Instead, the seller could recover as lost profits the difference
between the contract price and the cost of performance, the latter to be
determined by the sum of expenditures actually incurred at the time
of breach and the estimated cost to complete the contract.3 6 The seller
had the burden of proving the expense that would have been incurred
had there been no repudiation.37 The courts divided on how to treat
overhead which had been allocated to the contract. The treatment was
critical, for if the repudiation was held to "save" the overhead expense,
it was deducted from the contract price to reach the lost profit figure.
A few courts took this position apparently unconcerned that the seller
would be forced to reallocate the fixed cost to other units of produc-
tion.38 On the other hand, if overhead was treated as a fixed cost not
in construction contract cases where the owner repudiates before the builder has completed
performance. For representative cases and discussion on measure of recovery, proof, and
mitigation, see Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. Summit Constr. Co., 422 F.2d 242, 260-64 (8th Cir.
1969) (expenditures plus lost profit); Autrey v. Williams & Dunlop, 343 F.2d 730 (5th Cir.
1965) (expenditures only); Dade County v. Palmer & Baker, Eng'rs, 339 F.2d 208 (5th Cir.
1965) (loss contract); Farnsworth 1160-65.
36 E.g., cases cited in note 35 supra.
37 That is, the savings realized by the breach. See C. McCoaMvCK, supra note 11, § 174;
Harris, A General Theory for Measuring Seller's Damages for Total Breach of Contract,
60 MIcH. L. R.v. 577 (1962); Comment, Lost Profits as Contract Damages: Problems of Proof
and Limitations on Recovery, 65 YALE L.J. 992 (1956); Comment, supra note 35, at 105-09;
Note, Seller's Recovery When Buyer Repudiates Before Completion of Manufacture, 99
U. PA. L. REv. 229, 230-31 (1950); note 51 infra.
38 E.g., Wilhelm Lubrication Co. v. Brattrud, 197 Minn. 626, 632-34, 268 N.W. 634,
636-37 (1936); Worrell & Williams v. Kinnear Mfg. Co., 103 Va. 719, 49 S.E. 988 (1905). The
reasoning was that since overhead was part of the total cost of manufacturing, it should
be deducted to the extent "reasonably applicable to the undelivered portion." Perfecting
Serv. Co. v. Product Dev. & Sales Co., 259 N.C. 400, 415-16, 131 S.E.2d 9, 21-22 (1963). See
C.W. Rantoul Co. v. Claremont Paper Co., 196 F. 805 (1st Cir. 1912); Detroit Fireproofing
Tile Co. v. Vinton Co., 190 Mich. 275, 157 N.W. 8 (1916); C. McCoRamK, supra note 11,
§ 165, at 644, § 173, at 661-62. That such fixed costs allocated to defendant's contract would
have to be recovered from other customers was a matter of little concern. See A. Lenobel,
Inc. v. Senif, 252 App. Div. 533, 800 N.Y.S. 226 (2d Dep't 1937), modified, 253 App. Div.
813, 1 N.Y.S.2d 1022 (2d Dep't 1938) (argument is "specious'). When a government contract
is terminated for convenience in the "best interest" of the United States, the termination
settlement does not include overhead allocated to uncompleted work. According to the
language of the Termination for Convenience of the Government Clause, 32 C.F.R. § 8.701
(e)(ii) (1971), the unabsorbed fixed overhead is not reimbursable and must be reallocated
elsewhere. See, e.g., Nolan Bros., Inc. v. United States, 437 F.2d 1371 (Ct. Cl. 1971); Technol-
ogy, Inc., A.S.B.C.A. No. 14083, 71-2 CCH BD. CoNT. APP. DEC. 8956 (June 28, 1971);
Fairchild Stratos Corp., A.S.B.C.A. No. 9169, 67-1 id. 6225 (March 20, 1967), aj'd on
reconsideration, 68-1 id. 7053 (May 29, 1968); Trueger, Terminations-Cost Principles and
Costing Procedures, 129 J. ACCOUNTANCY, June 1970, at 59.
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saved by the breach, it would not be deducted from the contract price
and therefore would be recoverable as a "gross" profit prevented by the
breach. A number of courts have taken this position, 9 and the result
has been supported by the commentators.40 The assumption is that if
overhead is not recoverable the seller must reallocate it to other work
and thus reduce that work's profitability. Put another way, the seller
will be in a worse overall profit position than if the contract had been
fully performed.
In the Spartin case, at the time of contracting Spartin estimated
that variable costs of $32,500 would be incurred and allocated $5,000
in fixed overhead to the contract, a total estimated cost of $37,500. At
the time of repudiation, Spartin had incurred $15,000 in variable costs
and was planning on recovering the $5,000 overhead allocation under
the Blippo contract. Assuming all estimates to be accurate, if overhead
is treated as an expense saved, Spartin's lost profit recovery would be
the contract price ($50,000) less the sum of the actual reliance ($15,000)
and the expenses saved ($17,500 plus $5,000, or $22,500), which totals
$12,500. If overhead is not deducted, the "profit" figure would increase
by $5,000 to $17,500. In either case, the total recovery for breach of
contract would be the profit figure, however computed, plus the actual
reliance expenditure as adjusted for salvage and reasonable allocation,
some $9,000. If overhead is not deducted, therefore, Spartin would
recover a grand total of $26,500. 41
39 E.g., Vitex Mfg. Corp. v. Caribtex Corp., 377 F.2d 795 (3d Cir. 1967); Apex Metal
Stamping Co. v. Alexander & Sawyer, Inc., 48 N.J. Super. 476, 138 A.2d 568 (App. Div.
1958); Jessup & Moore Paper Co. v. Bryant Paper Co., 297 Pa. 483, 147 A. 519 (1929); see
Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. Summit Constr. Co., 422 F.2d 242, 265 (8th Cir. 1969); Distillers
Distrib. Corp. v. J.C. Millett Co., 310 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1963) (distributorship); Oakland
Calif. Towel Co. v. Sivils, 52 Cal. App. 2d 517, 126 P.2d 651 (1st Dist. 1942) (service con-
tract); Coast Indus., Inc. v. Noonan, 4 Conn. Cir. 333, 231 A.2d 663 (Circ. Ct. App. Div.
1966) (construction contracts); cf. Harris & Harris Constr. Co. v. Crain & Denbo, Inc.,
256 N.C. 110, 124-25, 123 S.E.2d 590, 600-01 (1962) (plaintiff failed to prove that defendant's
delay caused increase in overhead).
40 E.g., 5 A. CoIWIN, supra note 6, § 1038; R. NoammSTom, LAW OF SALES § 177 (1970);
Note, supra note 37, at 229; 19 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 375 (1968); 12 RuTGERs L. Rxv. 634
(1959); note 41 infra.
41 Since to establish lost profits the seller must prove what savings were realized, at
least one well reasoned case has held that he also bears the burden on the issue whether
a contested overhead cost was in fact saved by the breach. Apex Metal Stamping Co. v.
Alexander & Sawyer, Inc., 48 N.J. Super. 476, 486-87, 138 A.2d 568, 573-74 (App. Div. 1958).
See Schubert v. Midwest Broadcasting Co., 1 Wis. 2d 497, 85 N.W.2d 449 (1957). Professor
Robert Harris has stated:
The distinguishing mark of all components in this category [variable over-
head costs, called "multicontract assets"] is the fact that precise valuation is al-
most always impossible in the rough-and-tumble of litigation. For this reason
courts normally adopt one of two alternative courses. Sometimes they impose upon
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Arguably, Spartin should recover this amount under UCC section
2-708(2)42 although, as many commentators have noted, a certain
amount of stretching and tugging of that section is required.43 After
work has been stopped with no completed goods on hand, neither resale
under section 2-706 nor an action for the price under section 2-709 is
available, and the contract-market price formula of section 2-708(1)
plaintiff the burden of proving the value of such items, but ease the burden by
accepting highly imprecise evidence as sufficient to avoid nonsuit. On other occa-
sions they do not require any proof by the plaintiff as to this value, which is the
practical equivalent of a finding that abandonment did not result in any saving.
Either of these courses is preferable to insisting that plaintiff offer precise
proof of the value of his saved multicontract assets, because this would almost
always result in limiting him to nominal damages.... [The courts should require
plaintiff to prove the value of saved multicontract assets, but permit him to carry
the burden by evidence which, albeit not precise, errs in defendant's favor. The
only difference between treatment of items in this category and items in the three
other categories [assets yet to be acquired, real property on hand, services and
personalty on hand] where plaintiff also has the burden of proof is that "specula-
tive" or "uncertain" evidence of the value of multicontract assets should be toler-
ated.
Harris, supra note 34, at 73-74. Harris supports the recovery of fixed overhead allocated
to the contract and not saved by the breach. Id. at 102-04; Harris, supra note 37, at
588-92; Harris, A Radical Restatement of the Law of Seller's Damages: Michigan Results
Compared, 61 MicH. L. REv. 849, 860-65, 882-83 (1963); Harris, A Radical Restatement of
the Law of Seller's Damages: New York Results Compared, 34 FORDHAm L. Rlv. 23, 32-36
(1965).
42 If the measure of damages provided in subsection (1) is inadequate to put the
seller in as good a position as performance would have done then the measure of
damages is the profit (including reasonable overhead) which the seller would
have made from full performance by the buyer, together with any incidental
damages provided in this Article (Section 2-710), due allowance for costs reason-
ably incurred and due credit for payments or proceeds of resale.
UCC § 2-708(2).
43 Professor Ellen Peters has observed that § 2-708(2) is the only Code provision
remotely applicable to the problem and that it "at best points a court in the direction of
lost profits as the measure of damages for a seller who justifiably stops production."
Peters, supra note 35, at 274. Harris asserts that § 2-708 gives no guidance on some
very critical valuation questions-for example when to use the contract-market price
formula of § 2-708(1) or the components approach of § 2-708(2)-and concludes that
"[w]hile it is possible . . . to get sane results despite the language, it is unduly difficult."
Harris, supra note 34, at 108. Professor Robert Nordstrom agrees that § 2-708(2) is the
applicable section when a buyer has repudiated prior to the time that the goods are
complete (R. NoRsraom, supra note 40, § 177) and recent cases tend to support this con-
clusion. See Anchorage Centennial Dev. Co. v. Van Wormer & Rodrigues, Inc., 443 P.2d
596 (Alas. 1968); Detroit Power Screwdriver Co. v. Ladney, 25 Mich. App. 478, 181 N.W.2d
828 (1970). In Vitex Mfg. Corp. v. Caribtex Corp., 377 F.2d 795 (3d Cir. 1967), and Coast
Indus., Inc. v. Noonan, 4 Conn. Cir. 333, 231 A.2d 663 (Circ. Ct. App. Div. 1966), § 2-708(2)
was cited to support a components approach although a contract for sale of goods was not
involved. See also Distribu-Dor, Inc. v. Karadanis, 11 Cal. App. 3d 463, 90 Cal. Rptr. 231
(3d Dist. 1970) (middleman as a "special" circumstance); Chicago Roller Skate Mfg. Co. v.
Sokol Mfg. Co., 185 Neb. 515, 177 N.W.2d 25 (1970) (returned goods without a market);
Royal Store Fixture Co. v. Bucci, 48 Pa. D. & C.2d 696 (Philadelphia County Ct. 1969)
(seller failed to prove either cost of manufacture or the contract price).
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would not "put the seller in as good a position as performance would
have done. ' 44 Thus under UCC section 2-708(2), Spartin's measure of
recovery is its unsalvageable reliance expense, 45 plus the "profit (in-
cluding reasonable overhead) which the seller would have made from
full performance by the buyer," plus incidental damages under UCC
section 2-710. This interpretation preserves the pre-Code approach and
reinforces the decisions which treat overhead as a reimbursable cost
rather than a savings realized. Overhead, however, must be "reason-
able"; there is to date no authoritative application of this limitation.46
III
SELLER'S RECOVERY OF OVERHEAD: ECONOMIC COST THEORY
A. A Note by Way of Summary and Transition
In the Spartin case $5,000 of overhead was allocated to the Blippo
contract. Although the allocation of overhead through predetermined
rates to a particular contract has aspects of both arbitrariness and sub-
jectivity,4 7 we shall assume that this allocation took into account the
possibility that the allocation of fixed costs might change with unanti-
cipated variations in production but that Spartin's overhead expen-
diture remained constant during the period in question. Spartin's
expansible capacity, therefore, would be achieved solely by using dif-
ferent amounts of variable resources. Under the prevailing legal anal-
ysis, the $5,000 is not deducted from the contract price as a savings
realized and is therefore recoverable from Blippo. The primary reason
is that a denial of recovery would force Spartin to reallocate the over-
head cost to other work, thereby increasing the cost of those jobs and
presumably reducing overall profitability since each unit must then
bear a greater portion of the aliquot share of overhead. Thus Spartin
44 UCC § 2-708(2). "Such a seller has never been able to measure his losses by the
difference between contract and market, since the salvage value of unfinished goods
obviously bears no rational relationship to the seller's contemplated investment in the
contract." Peters, supra note 85, at 273. See Harris, supra note 84, at 70-72, 86-87. But see
Jagger Bros. v. Technical Textile Co., 202 Pa. Super. 689, 198 A.2d 888 (1964).
45 That is, "due allowance for costs reasonably incurred and due credit for payments
or proceeds of resale." UCC § 2-708(2).
46 Nordstrom has suggested that the limitation is designed "to allow the seller
recovery for any items which reasonably can be classified as overhead," rather than to
control overhead which is either too high or too low. R. NoPaSraoM, supra note 40, § 177,
at 540. Another possibility is that the limitation was intended to control the allocation of
overhead to particular contracts, that is, the allocation must be reasonable in light of
generally accepted accounting principles.
47 See note 31 supra.
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would be in a worse position because of breach than if Blippo had fully
performed and the purpose of compensatory damages would not be
achieved.
The purpose of this article is to test the accuracy of this legal
analysis through the application of economic cost theory.4 Whether
such analysis is correct under economic cost theory depends upon two
conditions at the time of contracting: (1) the competitive character of
the market, and (2) the stage of production in which Spartin finds itself.
The existence of these factors can be determined by the relationship
between the market price and Spartin's average cost curves.
To illustrate, consider figure 1 and assume that the market is
purely competitive,49 that is, price is not influenced by this seller's ac-
tions. At the time of contracting the seller's average fixed costs (over-
head) will decrease proportionately for every additional unit of produc-
tion secured. Put another way, as volume increases the seller can spread
his fixed costs over more units to produce cost savings. On the other
hand, the seller's average variable cost (A VC) and average total cost
48 Our analysis is based upon microeconomic theory and uses production and cost
theory; we have prepared a list of sources that supply more detailed discussion. See gen-
erally A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCrION THEORY IN USE 197-311 (1969);
C. ALLEN, J. BUCHANAN & M. COLBERG, PRICES, INCOME, AND PUBLIC POLICY 271-345 (2d ed.
1959); J. BAIN, PRICE THEORY 83-266 (1952); W. BAUMOL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS, 250-70, 311-37 (2d ed. 1965); K. BOULDING, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 475-567 (rev. ed.
1948); 1 K. BoULtNG, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS: MICROECONOMIcS 375-444 (4th ed. 1966); A. BRAFF,
MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 47-208 (1969); S. CARLSON, A STUDY ON THE PURE THEORY OP
PRODUCTION (1956); W. CARTER & W. SNAVELY, INTERMEDIATE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 93-199
(1961); J. CLARK, COMPErION AS A DYNAMIC PROCESs 118-77 (1961); C. FERGUSON, MICRO-
ECONOMIC THEORY 162-250 (rev. ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as FERGUSON]; J. HENDERSON &
R. QUANDT, MCROECONOMIC THEORY: A MATHEMATICAL APPROACH 42-124 (1958) [herein-
after cited as HENDERSON & QuANDT]; R. LErrwicH, THE PRICE SYsTEM AND RESOURCE ALLO-
CATION (1966) [hereinafter cited as LEFTwiCH]; E. MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY
AND APPLICATIONS 114-85 (1970); P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS
357-611 (8th ed. 1970); G. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 104-94 (3d ed. 1966).
49 A purely competitive market exists when the following conditions are met: (1)
firms produce a homogenous commodity and consumers are identical from the seller's
point of view in that there are no advantages or disadvantages associated with selling to
a particular consumer; (2) both firms and consumers are numerous and the sales to or
purchases from each individual unit are small in relation to the aggregate volume of trans-
actions; (3) both firms and consumers possess perfect information about prevailing price and
current bids and they take advantage of every opportunity to increase profits and utility
respectively; (4) entry into and exit from the market is free for both firms and consumers.
See FERGUSON 192-95; HENDERSON & QUANDT 86-87. Under these purely competitive assump-
tions, demand is perfectly elastic. Cf. note 65 infra.
Although few economists insist that pure competition characterizes markets in the
United States, the model of pure competition provides a starting point for analysis of
that segment of the market in which competition does exist (see LEFTwicH 23-24), permits
accurate explanation and prediction of real world phenomena, and frequently works as a
theoretical model of economic process. See FERGUSON 185.
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FIGURE 1. Short run average and marginal cost functions.
(A TC) will be decreasing or increasing depending upon the volume of
production. Initially, average variable cost will decrease, but at some
point in overall operation it will begin to rise.5" When the increase in
average variable cost equals and exceeds the per unit decrease in aver-
age fixed cost (AFC), average total cost will begin to rise. Still assuming
a purely competitive market, if at the time of contracting both average
fixed and variable costs are decreasing, the seller is in what we call
stage I. If average variable cost is increasing but average total cost is
still decreasing, then the seller is in what we call stage II. If average
50 Average variable cost will decrease at first because of increased efficiency or be-
cause additional resources can be procured at lower prices. Assume, for example, that a
certain factory is designed to employ approximately 100 workers. Further assume that
labor is the only variable resource. If only one worker is employed, the output will be
extremely small. If one additional person is employed, the output will more than double
because of the resultant division and specialization of labor. If the doubling of variable
cost results in a greater than proportionate increase in output, average variable cost de-
creases. Throughout stage I, the added variable cost results in a more than proportionate
increase in output and average variable cost decreases. At some point, however, the
addition of-more workers will result in less ouput per worker, largely because of the law
of diminishing returns. See note 60 infra. At this point, average variable cost begins to
increase. See LEFrW-ICH 135; C. MCCONNEL, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS, AND POLICIES
442-43 (3d ed. 1966).
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variable cost is rising and average total cost is either constant or rising,
so that increases in average variable cost equal or exceed the per unit
decrease in average fixed cost, then the seller is in what we call stage III.
Our thesis is that if the seller is in stage III, the allowance of over-
head as damages will put him in a better overall position than if the
buyer had fully performed. In stage III relieving the seller of the neces-
sity of incurring increasing variable costs will at least equal the savings
that the seller could have achieved if permitted to spread overhead costs
to particular units of production covered by the contract. Put another
way, since average variable costs increase more than average fixed costs
decrease in stage III, the reallocation of overhead to other work upon
breach, although increasing the aliquot share of overhead costs to some
extent, will be exceeded by the savings in not hav'ing to incur the pro-
jected variable costs. Thus for the seller in stage III, which is the most
likely place for the rational firm seeking to recover total costs and earn
a profit,5 ' the recovery of overhead results in overcompensation because
it places the seller in a better overall profit position than could have
been achieved by full performance.
Before applying economic cost theory to the Spartin case, we shall
briefly examine the theory which forms the basis for these costs curves.
B. Cost of Production
A seller's decision to contract for the sale of goods is determined
by the cost of production and its relationship to the revenue expected
to be generated by the contract.5 2 Production costs for a particular
51 Two factors motivate a seller to prefer stage III. First, in stage I, under the purely
competitive market assumptions, market price is less than the average variable cost. Thus
if the seller chooses to operate he will not even be able to recover all of his additional
costs of production. In stage II the seller can recover all of his variable costs and some
portion of his fixed or overhead costs. But unless he can recover all of the fixed costs, he
will not make additional investments in fixed resources. Once the fixed resources are
exhausted, the seller should pursue some alternative enterprise. In stage III the seller will
be able to recover all of his fixed and variable costs.
Second, the seller will maximize profits in stage III by producing the level of output
at which price is equal to marginal cost. At this same price if the firm elects to operate
in stage I instead of stage III, it will maximize losses. This should effectively preclude
stage I operation for the rational seller who is interested in operating his business at a
profit. In stage IL under purely competitive conditions the seller can only minimize losses
by production. See LFIxWIcH 162-65.
52 In the short run, the seller's decision to contract will rest on whether or not the
price of the product will cover the average variable cost. If market price is equal to
average variable cost, it makes no difference whether the seller produces or not. If market
price is less than average variable cost, the seller will minimize losses by discontinuing
production. If average variable cost is less than market price, the seller should produce
since he can thereby recover all of his variable costs and have some excess to defray the
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seller are affected by both the physical relationship between input of
resources and output of products and the combination of resources
used.53 In addition, the seller is subject to market influences such as
general price increases or decreases, government action either establish-
ing minimum wages or wage freezes, and legislative enactments or
judicial decisions which affect the conditions of production. The total
cost incurred by a seller is the net result of his decisions to produce
subject to the influence of the factors affecting production costs.54
As we have seen, the total costs incurred by a seller can be classi-
fied as total fixed costs and total variable costs. Total fixed costs refers
to all costs that a seller cannot vary during the relevant time period.
These fixed costs determine capacity in the seller's production lot, and
plant capacity determines the upper limit of the volume of production
that the seller is capable of processing.5, It is assumed that Spartin in
the relevant short run period would not acquire additional plant capa-
city but would achieve expansible capacity solely by using different
quantities of variable resources. Under this assumption, total fixed cost
is the equivalent of overhead referred to in judicial opinions.5 6
Total variable costs refers to obligations of the seller which are in-
curred as the direct result of decisions to produce different numbers of
product units. Expenditures on such items as labor, raw materials, and
fixed expenses. If market price is higher than the average total cost, which includes both
overhead and variable expenses, the seller can maximize profits by production if marginal
revenue is equal to marginal cost. See LErrWiCH 160; G. STIGLER, supra note 48, at 134-59.
53 The physical relationship between resources and output is represented by the
production function. The combination of resources used is represented by the seller's
expansion path. These equations plus the cost equation for the resources used can be
combined into a single equation in which cost is stated as a function of the level of
output plus the cost of fixed inputs. See HENDFSON & QUANDT, 55-62.
54 See, e.g., G. STIGLER, supra note 48, at 187.
55 The quantities of the fixed resources used determine the size of the seller's plant.
Plant capacity sets the upper limit to the amount of ouput the seller is capable of
producing in the short run. The seller can vary his output up to that limit by increasing
or decreasing the quantity of variable resources used. Changes in plant capacity can be
achieved by changing the quantities of the fixed resources used-but only in the long run.
See LE rwscH 130.
56 Total fixed costs refers to the entire cost obligation of the seller for fixed resources.
In economic terms, a resource that is irretrievably committed to the production process
becomes a fixed cost. For example, if chemicals are applied to a growing crop, at the
moment of application they become a fixed cost. Similarly, once an employee is engaged
under a contract for a definite period of time, this labor becomes a fixed cost. See id. at
129. But neither labor nor raw materials are usually considered to be overhead expenses,
since the level of either can usually be altered in the short run. See note 29 supra. In
the Spartin problem, the graphite purchased and the additional employee engaged are
examples of "lost" costs and not included as overhead. See note 41 supra. But to facilitate
theoretical development of this analysis it is assumed that these costs remained variable
and no other fixed resources were acquired.
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transportation are usually considered to be variable.57 Total variable
cost necessarily increases as the number of production units increases
since larger quantities of variable resources are required and hence
larger cost obligations are incurred.58
Table 1 is an illustrative presentation of the total costs of a seller
with different levels of production of a product.
TABLE 1
TOTAL COST
Quantity of Total Total Total
Output Fixed Costs Variable Costs Costs
1 $100 $ 40 $140
2 100 70 170
3 100 85 185
4 100 96 196
5 100 104 204
6 100 110 210
7 100 115 215
8 100 120 220
9 100 126 226
10 100 134 234
11 100 145 245
12 100 160 260
13 100 180 280
14 100 206, 806
15 100 239 339
16 100 280 880
17 100 330 430
18 100 390 490
19 100 461 561
20 100 544 644
For convenience fixed costs (overhead) are constant at one hundred
dollars for the relevant time period. The variable cost data have been
selected to reflect the cost relationship usually assumed by economists59
57 See Lra rwcH 129. But see note 29 supra.
58 See IEFrwsH 132-33.
59 It is usually assumed that the average variable cost curve is U-shaped. This charac-
teristic U-shape is the result of the relative efficiency with which variable resources are
used in the production of successively larger units of output in the short run, and of the
relative efficiency of successively larger plants in the long run. See, e.g., id. at 135, 143;
FERousoN 180-83. If different assumptions are made concerning the conditions of produc-
tion, the shape of the cost curve will change. If it is assumed, for example, that the ap-
propriate production function is the Cobb-Douglas production function, the average cost
curve will not have the U-shape. See A. BRATr, supra note 48, at 79-82; FERGUSON 149; note
60 infra.
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and thus to show increased efficiency in the utilization of resources over
a portion of the range of production. Once production reaches the
eleven-unit level, however, progressively larger outputs use these varia-
ble resources less efficiently.60 Although total cost concepts reflect the
same kind of information as average cost, they are not generally used
for planning purposes, but find their greatest utility in deriving average
cost for the seller.01
Average cost is a useful tool both in planning production and in
evaluating the influence of changes or disruptions of the productive pro-
cess. Average costs can be derived by dividing the relevant total costs by
the corresponding level of production. 62 The average total costs in
table 2 have been derived from the total costs in table 1. The average
fixed costs, average variable costs, and average total costs were derived
from fixed cost, variable costs, and total costs respectively. Figure 1
expresses cost as a function of output and graphically relates the infor-
mation in table 2.
These cost concepts provide the basic framework that will be
utilized to determine the seller's stage of production and the propriety
of overhead compensation. Further elaboration on these concepts is
integrated into subsequent sections in order to relate theory to actual
remedial problems.
C. Rational Areas of Production
1. Purely Competitive Market
Under purely competitive conditions, market price equals marginal
revenue and is constant for all levels of output offered by a seller. Al-
though the necessary conditions for the existence of a purely competitive
market do not frequently occur, substantial competition often does exist
and the assumption of pure competition provides a convenient basis for
analysis.63 With the exception of one partial relaxation of the assump-
tion of pure competition in the subsequent section, 4 further departures
60 Relative efficiency in the use of variable resources in the short run results from the
law of diminishing returns, which states that if the input of one resource is increased
by equal increments per unit of time while inputs of other resources are held constant,
total production will increase but beyond some point the resulting increases will become
smaller and smaller. See LE-FTWcH 99-101. In the long run, relative efficiency in the use
of variable resources results from the efficiency with which plants of various sizes use
variable resources. See id. at 143-44; FERusoN 180-83.
61 See IEFvici 134.
62 Id. at 135.
63 See note 49 supra.
64 See notes 69-72 and accompanying text infra.
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TABLE 2
AvERAGE Cosrs
Quantity of
Output
1
2
3
4
5
Average
Fixed Costs
$100.00
50.00
33.33
25.00
20.00
16.67
14.29
12.50
11.11
10.00
9.09
8.33
7.69
7.14
6.67
6.25
5.88
5.55
5.26
5.00
Average
Variable Costs
$40.00
35.00
28.33
24.00
20.80
18.33
16A3
15.00
14.00
13A0
13.18
13.33
13.85
14.72
15.93
17.50
19.41
21.67
24.27
27.20
Average
Total
Costs
$140.00
85.00
61.66
49.00
40.80
35.00
30.72
27.50
25.11
23A0
22.27
21.66
21.54
21.86
22.60
23.75
25.29
27.22
29.53
32.20
from this assumption would contribute unnecessary complexity to our
analysis.6 5
The rational area of production includes levels of output at which
the rational firm could choose to produce at alternative prices. Under
purely competitive conditions the lower limit to the rational area of
production is established by the minimum point on the average variable
cost curve, $13.18 in figure 1. This is the minimum price at which a
seller could be induced to produce at all.68 At lower prices, the seller
does not even recover all of his variable expenses and would minimize
his losses by choosing not to incur them-that is, by ceasing production.
65 If it is assumed, for example, that the seller's market is not purely competitive,
the demand curve for the seller's product is no longer perfectly elastic and thus not
equivalent to marginal revenue. See note 49 and accompanying text supra. The income
from an additional unit is no longer p but is p (1 + -I) where p = price and Ed =
elasticity of demand. In order to avoid the additional complexity involved in using a
demand curve that is not perfectly elastic, we assume for this analysis the purely com-
petitive market. See LasrWIcH 184-86.
66 See note 52 supra.
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In stage II under purely competitive conditions, prices are such
that the seller will minimize losses by continuing production but are
not sufficiently high to permit the seller to recover all of his costs of
production. 7 In economic terminology, any return which exceeds the
variable cost is called a return to fixed resources and includes both the
return of any portion of the fixed costs (overhead) and, when prices
are sufficiently high, overhead plus a profit. At any price level which
permits a return to fixed resources, the seller, at least in the short run,
minimizes losses by continuing production. In figure 1, the seller will
operate in stage II when prices are between $13.18 and $21.54.
When the price in figure 1 exceeds $21.54, the beginning of stage
III, the return to fixed resources includes a full return of the aliquot
share of overhead expenses plus a profit. In stage III the seller can po-
tentially maximize profits by production of additional output.
In summary, the results of producing in the three stages of produc-
tion in a purely competitive market are as follows: (1) in stage I the
seller minimizes losses by choosing not to produce at all since he would
not even recover all of his added expenditure required to produce the
output; (2) in stage II the seller has some return to fixed resources and
minimizes losses by producing in the short run; (3) in stage III the seller
recovers all of his expenses and thus can potentially maximize profits
by producing.
Since in either stages I or II the best the seller could hope to do is
minimize losses, and since only in stage III will he enjoy a profit, the
seller with a profit motive will obviously prefer stage III. The seller
operating in any other stage is at a competitive disadvantage. 68
2. Market Not Purely Competitive
Where the market is not purely competitive, a seller will maximize
his profits or minimize his losses by producing at any time when there is
67 Stage II was defined in section III(A) of the text as that portion of the seller's
range of production between the minimum points of his average variable cost curve and
his average total cost curve. In this range of production in a purely competitive market,
market price is less than average total costs at all possible outputs. Thus the seller will
always incur losses. But if market price is greater than average variable cost the seller will
minimize losses by production. Total receipts exceed total variable costs and thus produc-
tion reduces losses to an amount less than total fixed cost. See LErFwicH 163-64.
68 The optimum scale for the production of any level of output is the plant with a
short run average cost curve tangent to the long run average cost curve at that level of
output. A plant of any other size will produce outputs at higher per unit costs than the
optimum scale of plant. Id. at 147-48. Under conditions of pure competition sellers will
build the optimum scale of plant. Other plants have higher costs and will operate at a
competitive disadvantage. The seller should then operate at the level of output at which
marginal cost equals marginal revenue. Id. at 147, 162. This will always occur in stage III.
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an available market sufficiently large to permit sales of output at a
market price greater than or equal to average variable cost. 69 Conse-
quently, a seller may operate in all three stages of production.
The first requirement for the seller to operate in stage I is that
prices be maintained at a level higher than the level that would exist
in a purely competitive market.7 0 Either under this condition or if the
seller would minimize losses by continuing production, stage II opera-
tion is justified. Prices above the purely competitive level can result
from such factors as the number of sellers in the market, the incidence
of government price supports, or the existence of a particularly advan-
tageous contract fixing the price.
A second requirement for operation in stages I or II is that the
seller be faced with a limited demand for his product, or that he have
incorrectly estimated the market potential for his product. Under these
conditions, the seller, if he survives, will adjust his capacity and will
thereafter operate in stage 111.71
Given these restrictions, it seems unlikely that a seller will operate
in either stages I or II. Although the seller would maximize profits from
the existing plant by so operating, he would always attempt to reduce
his capacity in order to operate in stage III since the seller who operates
in either stages I or II is at a competitive disadvantage.7 2
D. Propriety of Overhead Recovery Under Economic Cost Theory
Under economic cost theory the propriety of allowing overhead as
damages for breach of contract depends upon two conditions at the time
of contracting: the competitive character of the market and the stage of
production in which the seller finds himself. The stage of production
can readily be determined from the particular seller's cost curves. A
detailed determination of the competitive character of the seller's mar-
ket would require an examination of the demand sector of the economy.
For purposes of this analysis, however, competitive character can be de-
09 In a market that is not purely competitive, demand is no longer equivalent to
marginal revenue. The price may be sufficiently high to justify operation in all three
stages of production. The seller may even maximize profits from his existing plant in
stages I or II and thus have no incentive to operate in stage 1I1. See, e.g., id. at 186-89;
FERGUSON 220-50. When this occurs, the seller can still improve his competitive position
by reducing his plant capacity so that the short run average cost curve is tangent to the
long run average cost curve at that level of output. See note 68 supra. It is only when the
market will not permit the seller to sell sufficient output to reach at least the minimum
point on his long run average cost curve that the seller will continue to operate in stages
I or II. See FERGUSON 176-79; LarrWmic 141-48, 190-93.
70 See, e.g., Lmvrwicu 186-89.
71 See notes 68 & 69 supra.
72 See note 68 supra.
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termined by comparing the relative level of market prices to the aver-
age variable cost for the stage I seller and the average total cost for the
stage II seller. The comparison is not necessary for the stage III seller,
since the competitive character of the market does not affect the pro-
priety of his overhead recovery. When the market price is higher than
the average variable cost for the stage I seller or the average total cost
for the stage II seller at the relevant level of output, the market is not
purely competitive. If the market price for the relevant level of output
is lower than the average variable cost for the stage I seller or the average
total cost for the stage II seller, the market can be treated as though it
were purely competitive. Let us now combine stages of production with
competitive character to test, in general, the propriety of overhead re-
covery.
1. Stage I Seller and the Character of Competition
In stage I, both the average fixed and average variable cost curves
are decreasing at the time of contracting. Under purely competitive
conditions, it is unlikely that the rational seller would choose to produce
in stage I because the contract price will not cover even the variable
expenses incurred in production, not to mention overhead. If, however,
a contract was entered into under these conditions and breached by the
buyer, the stage I seller still should not recover overhead. Although the
savings lost through the inability to spread overhead to additional units
of production would not be equalled or exceeded by the savings retained
by elimination of additional variable costs, the projected loss on full
performance precludes reimbursement for fixed costs. In a noncom-
petitive market, however, the rational seller would operate in stage I
if the market price exceeded average variable cost, which is the purely
competitive price ceiling. Upon breach, then, the seller should recover
unsalvaged variable costs plus all of the overhead allocated to the con-
tract and, depending upon the relationship of the contract price to
average variable and average total cost curves, these costs plus any lost
profit.
2. Stage II Seller and the Character of Competition
In stage II, the average variable cost curve is increasing but the
average total cost curve is still decreasing. Under purely competitive
conditions, the rational seller might choose to produce in stage II since
the contract price, even though less than average total cost, would cover
all variable costs incurred and some portion of the aliquot share of
overhead. No profit, however, could be earned because the market price
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would not exceed average total cost. However, upon breach by the
buyer, the seller should recover as damages all overhead allocated to
the contract plus variable costs actually incurred up to the breach, sub-
ject to an adjustment for any loss that would have been suffered on full
performance. In a noncompetitive market, the price may be higher than
average total cost. Thus upon full performance the seller would have
recovered all of the costs plus a profit. Upon breach, the seller should
recover only that part of the overhead allocated to the contract which
is not neutralized by the savings he retains in being relieved of incurring
variable costs, and because full performance would not produce a loss.
3. Stage III Seller and the Character of Competition
In stage III both the average total and average variable cost curves
are rising. Under both purely competitive and noncompetitive condi-
tions, the market price will exceed average total cost and the seller, by
full performance, may recover all fixed and variable costs plus some
profit. Upon breach, however, the loss to the seller in being unable to
spread overhead to another unit of production is neutralized or ex-
ceeded by the savings realized in being relieved of the need to incur
variable costs for full performance. This is because the average fixed
cost curve is decreasing and the average variable cost curve is increasing.
Thus if the seller is not harmed by the inability to spread overhead
further, overhead recovery, upon breach by the buyer results in over-
compensation and is inconsistent with the primary purpose of compen-
satory damages.
E. Application of Economic Cost Theory
1. The Vitex Case
In Vitex Manufacturing Corp. v. Caribtex Corp.,73 the Vitex Cor-
poration was engaged in the business of chemically treating cloth for
duty free importation into the United States. For this purpose, Vitex
maintained a plant in the Virgin Islands and was entitled to process a
specified quantity of material under the Virgin Islands quota system.
Caribtex was in the business of importing cloth into the Islands, secur-
ing its processing, and exporting it to the United States.
In the fall of 1963 Vitex, with an unused portion of its quota but
no customers, closed its plant. Caribtex acquired some Italian wool and
the parties entered a contract in which Vitex agreed to process 125,000
yards of the Caribtex woolen material. Subsequently, Vitex reopened
its Virgin Islands plant, ordered the necessary materials, recalled its
73 877 F.2d 795 (3d Cir. 1967).
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work force, and made the necessary preparations to begin performance.
Caribtex repudiated before performance had started, and Vitex brought
suit to recover lost profits. The Third Circuit, after stressing the differ-
ence between fixed and variable costs, upheld the recovery of overhead
as necessary to put the seller in the same position as if full performance
had occurred, noting that "the successful businessman must set his
prices at sufficient levels to recoup all his expenses, including overhead,
and to gain profits."74
The economic cost theory developed in this article provides a
framework for critical evaluation of the propriety of this overhead
recovery. As previously suggested, recovery of part or all of the overhead
upon breach by the buyer is proper only if the seller is in a market that
is not purely competitive in stages I or II, or in a market that is purely
competitive in stage II subject, however, to adjustment for losses that
the seller would have incurred on full performance. In those situations
the rational seller would not contract unless the price was sufficiently
high to recover all of his variable costs and have some return to his fixed
resources, as either an aliquot share of overhead or as profits. Even so,
the seller would be at a competitive disadvantage in stages I or I17, and
would continue there only if faced with a limited demand for his prod-
uct. Presumably, the rational buyer would contract on this basis only
if he had no choice in selecting the seller or if he were unable to contract
at a price that would exist in a purely competitive market.
Although the Vitex opinion recites no facts conclusive as to the
seller's stage of production or the competitive character of the market,
the probabilities are that Vitex was in stage III of a noncompetitive
market. First, Vitex may have already processed sufficient quantities of
wool to place it in stage III for the relevant time period before closing
the plant. This suggestion is reinforced by the incentive to operate in
stage III rather than stages I or 11.76 Second, the character of the market
is indicated by the fact that to meet the needs of Caribtex, Vitex opened
a plant previously closed for lack of orders. Limited demand is strong
evidence of a noncompetitive market. Based upon these data, economic
cost theory would not support the recovery of overhead.
Without sufficient data, however, conclusions based upon probabil-
ities as to what rational sellers and buyers would do are rather thin. In
fact, because of limited demand and excess capacity,77 Vitex may very
74 Id. at 798. See note 59 supra.
75 See notes 68-70 and accompanying text supra.
76 Vitex could improve its competitive position by reducing plant capacity and
thereby operate in stage III. See note 69 supra.
77 A typical excess capacity case is Jessup & Moore Paper Co. v. Bryant Paper Co.,
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well have been in either stage I or stage II in a noncompetitive market
even though the rational seller would have preferred to be elsewhere.
The point is that the court's conclusion based upon legal analysis would
be consistent with economic cost theory only under a limited set of
circumstances; the probabilities are against the existence of those cir-
cumstances in Vitex. This fact and the potential clash between legal
reasoning and economic reality78 prompt a return to the Spartin case.
2. The Spartin Case
To avoid the uncertainties in Vitex, it is necessary to estimate em-
pirically the seller's cost curves. Actual cost curves comparable to those
in figure 1 can be estimated from a seller's cost and output data, such as
that contained in the appendix.7 9 These curves will assume various
shapes for different sellers depending upon the efficiency with which
resources are used, the importance to the seller of economies of size, and
the time period under consideration.8
297 Pa. 483, 147 A. 519 (1929). The lower court found that prior to the Bryant contract
the seller was producing 22 cooks of soda pulp per day and had a 26-cook capacity. To
perform the Bryant contract, the plaintiff would have been required to produce 24V
cooks per day. The lower court found that the same number of men were required to
complete the smaller number of cooks as would be needed to supply the larger number.
It further determined that general expenses would not be increased if the plant operated
at the increased capacity. On these facts the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the
plaintiff's recovery should not be reduced by deducting charges necessarily involved in
the general operation of the business from the profit he would have received from per-
formance. In other words, the court held that excess capacity did not require the treatment
of overhead as a cost saved since the breach meant that other units now had to carry
a greater share of the general expenses than they would had the contract been fully per-
formed.
This reasoning seems to assume that excess capacity cannot exist in stage I. But the
rational seller will prefer to operate in stage III between the levels of output at which
average cost reaches a minimum and the level at which marginal cost equals marginal
revenue. See Luxwc 140, 141-48, 162, 188. There may be excess capacity for this seller
because of normal fluctuations in the market demand. Excess capacity can also exist if the
seller has an average cost curve which reaches a minimum and is constant throughout the
relevant range of production. See, e.g., FERGUsoN 180-83, 260-62. An example could be the
seller of fixed price items referred to in UCC § 2-708(2), Comment 2, whose products are
in limited demand but who has an unlimited supply for sale. The constant level of average
total cost occurs because the advantage gained by spreading average fixed cost is exactly
offset by increases in average variable cost. The minimum level of average total cost marks
the beginning of stage I. Since at least for the relevant range of outputs there are no
economic incentives for the seller to limit his output, this seller has excess capacity for a
wide range of levels of output. Significantly, at all levels of output in stage III this seller
should not receive an overhead recovery.
78 There is also a potential clash between economic cost theory and generally accepted
accounting principles if the latter are used to justify the Vitex result. See 19 CasE W. REs.
L. R v. 375 (1968).
79 APPENDIx (Table A).
80 FERGUSON 180-83; HENDERSON & QUANDT 46, 58; LarricH 138, 141, 144.
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The Spartin case has been developed from the cost and output data
contained in the appendix. The cost curves in figure 2 and the corre-
sponding equations were derived using the statistical technique and the
econometric methods discussed in the appendix.8
STAGE I
i
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STAGEIf
300 40
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FIGURE 2. Spartin's average and marginal cost functions.
Assume that Spartin's cost curves, displayed in figure 2, were first
prepared after the repudiation by Blippo. Spartin's average variable
cost equation was found to be as follows: AVC = 0.6 - (0.25 X 10- 6)
V+ (0.7 X 10-12) V2. The minimum point can be found graphically
(figure 2) or by setting the first derivative of average variable cost with
respect to output equal to zero and solving for the volume of output.8 2
The minimum point is determined to be at a level of output of $180,000
and marks the beginning of stage II of production. Spartin's aver-
age cost equation is AC - $50,000 .6 (025 X 0-6)V + (0.7 X
10-12) V2. The minimum point on the average cost curve is at approxi-
81 APPENDiX (third and fourth equations).
82 See HENDERSON & QUANDT 265-67.
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mately the $400,000 value of output (figure 2)83 which marks the begin-
ning of stage III of production. Spartin's level of output prior to the
Blippo contract was $500,000. This places Spartin in stage III of pro-
duction (figure 2). Since no stage III seller should recover overhead, the
$5,000 overhead element in Spartin's remedy should be deducted from
gross profits."'
Why this is so can be demonstrated graphically from figure 2 or
numerically by solving the appropriate average cost or average variable
cost equation for values of V to obtain the figures used herein. At the
time of contracting with Blippo, Spartin had a total revenue of $500,000
and total costs, fixed and variable, of $375,000 for a total profit of
$125,000, or 25 percent of total sales. If Spartin had completed the
Blippo contract, total revenue would have increased by $50,000 to
$550,000, and total costs would have increased by the additional vari-
able costs incurred, some $45,863 to $420,863. The $5,000 overhead
figure, while allocated to the contract, would not of course increase
total costs. Thus, at the completion of the Blippo contract, Spartin
would have had a total profit of $129,137, some 23 per cent of total sales.
Although net profit increased by $4,137, the decrease in the ratio of
profit to sales was caused by the incurring of increasing variable costs
in stage III. Suppose, however, that Blippo repudiated the contract be-
fore Spartin had incurred any variable costs and that the court, looking
at Spartin's cost curves, awarded lost profit in the amount of $4,137, the
difference between the contract price of $50,000 and the estimated but
saved variable costs of $45,863. Here Spartin's total revenue would in-
crease by $4,137 to $504,137, and its total costs would remain constant
at $375,000-since no new variable costs were in fact incurred and over-
head remained fixed. The total profit at this point would be $129,137,
the same figure that would exist if Spartin were permitted to complete
the Blippo contract. However, the percentage of profit after repudiation
is 24 percent, although the percentage of profit had the contract been
completed would be 23 percent. This illustrates dramatically the sav-
ings in being relieved of the necessity to incur increasing variable costs.
It also confirms that if, upon repudiation and the recovery of net gains
prevented, Spartin's overall profitability is the same as would have been
produced by complete performance, the addition of overhead to the
recovery would put Spartin in a better profit position than would have
been achieved by full performance. Put another way, even though full
performance would have reimbursed Spartin for the fixed and variable
83 Id.
84 See note 59 supra.
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costs involved, Spartin can, upon repudiation, absorb the fixed costs
allocated to the contract without affecting overall profitability. This re-
sult would not be significantly altered by adding to total revenue and
total cost the $9,000 in unsalvageable reliance, which should also be
recovered as damages.
The empirically estimated cost curves can be used for another
purpose. Spartin expected to make a $12,500 profit on the Blippo con-
tract. Cost curves can be used to determine whether or not these expec-
tations were realistic. In stage III, variable costs increase more than the
overhead expenses decrease when additional output is produced. Conse-
quently, the per unit cost that Spartin would have incurred in perform-
ing the Blippo contract would have been higher than the per unit cost
that it had incurred at its former levels of production. Unless Spartin
anticipated this increase in average cost, its expected profit at the time
of contracting was unrealistically high. The extent to which any seller
actually considers the possibility that the efficiency of his production
will drop with an increase in volume would be difficult to establish.
Fortunately actual proof in the Spartin case is not necessary because
cost curves are available. At the $500,000 level of production which
existed prior to the Blippo contract, Spartin had a net profit of $125,000
(total revenue minus total cost for 1971). s5 At the $550,000 level of pro-
duction which would have resulted from performance by Blippo, Spar-
tin would have earned a profit of $129,137 (total revenue minus total
cost for the level of output that would have resulted from the Blippo
contract). After deducting overhead, the profit prevented by the Blippo
breach was $4,137. If the remedy seeks only to put the aggrieved party
in as good a position as he would have obtained from performance, the
lost profit which Spartin should recover would be $4,137 and not the
$12,500 which it anticipated at the time of contracting.s6
85 The total revenue of a firm selling in a purely competitive market is derived by
the number of units he sells (q) multiplied by the fixed price (p) per unit he receives. H-is
profit is the difference between total revenue and total cost:
n=pq - C
The first order conditions for profit maximization require that each input be utilized up
to a point at which the value of the additional output equals price. A firm can increase
its profit as long as the addition to revenue from the employment of the additional unit
of input exceeds its cost.
This analysis assumes that the second order conditions for profit mazimization are
also met. See HENDERSON & QUANDT 53. If the market is not purely competitive, the proce-
dure for determining profit is the same except that the price and cost elements in the
equation must then be adjusted to reflect the elasticity of demand and supply respectively.
86 Since the second equation in the Appendix is the basis for determining the level
of fixed costs, it is not necessary to rely on subjective classifications of costs as either over-
head or variable or on arbitrary allocations of overhead to a particular contract. Further-
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Reliance on the change in total revenue minus total cost to deter-
mine the actual profit that Spartin lost by virtue of the breach provides
an objective basis to determine the extent to which Spartin's expecta-
tions would have been fulfilled if Blippo had fully performed. Damages
can thereby be limited to the recovery necessary to place the seller in as
good but no better position than would have resulted from full perfor-
mance.
Using a purely legal analysis we concluded that Spartin's recovery
under section 2-708(2) would be $26,500. Based upon the data for
Spartin contained in the appendix and the application of economic cost
theory, this amount should be reduced by the $5,000 overhead figure,
since Spartin is a stage III seller, and by the further amount of $8,363,
the extent to which the anticipated profit was unrealistic. Consequently
$13,137, not $26,500 is the amount required to put Spartin "in as good
a position as if the other party had fully performed."
CONCLUSION
The overhead dilemma is most sharply posed when the buyer re-
pudiates a contract for the sale of manufactured goods and the seller,
after properly stopping performance, seeks damages under UCC section
2-708(2).17 Under economic cost theory, overhead recovery is proper
only when the seller at the time of contracting is either in a noncom-
petitive market in stages I or II, or in a purely competitive market in
stage II, subject to adjustment for losses that would have been incurred
upon full performance. It is not proper for the stage III seller since the
savings realized from not having to incur variable costs equal or exceed
the loss from being unable to spread fixed costs over one more unit of
production. The overall profitability of the firm will not be reduced
by reallocating these fixed costs to other units of production. Thus,
more, this approach does not require reliance on an accountant correctly labeling an
item as a fixed or variable cost. Instead, costs are analyzed as they apply to the particular
seller and according to the extent to which expenses are either fixed or variable in his
productive processes. By using this approach, the remedy can compensate for differences
in the internal organization of different sellers' businesses. By objectively classifying costs
as fixed or variable, it is possible to compensate this seller for his particularized damages
without the risk that the remedy will put him in a better position than he would have
obtained from performance.
87 If the seller completes performance, or has completed goods on hand and resells
them under UCC § 2-706(1), or recovers the price under § 2-709, the overhead initially
allocated to the contract need not be reallocated to other contracts. The total costs incurred
will be reimbursed up to the contract price, with profit depending upon both the competi-
tive character of the market and the seller's lost volume. Cf. Harris, supra note 34, at 76-87.
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unless the "reasonable overhead" language of UCC section 2-708(2) is
interpreted to deny overhead recovery to the stage III seller,s8 the dam-
age award will put the seller in a better overall profit position than he
would have gained from full performance.
Under this interpretation, new problems of proof are presented for
the seller. In addition to proving variable costs saved with reasonable
certainty, 9 the seller will be required to produce empirically estimated
cost curves to refute the probability that he is operating in stage III.
These curves are also relevant in determining both the competitive
character of the market and the extent to which the estimate of net
profit prevented was realistic. Since only the seller has ready access to
the data necessary to develop these curves, the burden of production
should arguably fall on him. A failure to produce these curves, then,
should limit the seller's recovery to variable costs actually incurred at
the time of breach, as adjusted for reasonable salvage and reallocation
to other jobs.90
A full use of economic cost theory in the Spartin case would re-
quire the seller to justify losses claimed as a result of breach in the light
of overall business operations for some relevant period. The critical test
is the change in overall profitability, if any, as measured by the differ-
ence between total revenue and total costs at the time of contracting
and at the time of repudiation. The result in the Spartin case would be
(1) the recovery of less damages than permitted under the prevailing
legal analysis, and (2) seemingly more complicated problems of proof.
Both effects tend to confirm Farnsworth's conclusions about the solici-
tude afforded contract breachers by the legal system, and to aggravate
the fairness problem that arises when the cost of proving actual losses is
excessively high. In light of these effects, should economic cost theory
prevail in a case like Spartin?
The answer to this question compels a return to basic considera-
88 See note 46 supra.
89 See notes 17 & 37 supra. The accuracy of the plaintiff's proof of costs saved by the
breach may always be contested by the defendant. See Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. Summit
Constr. Co., 422 F.2d 242, 260-64 (8th Cir. 1969).
90 See note 35 supra. If the variable costs incurred plus the savings realized by the
breach exceed the contract price, the reliance expenditures should be reduced in propor-
tion to the total loss projected upon full performance. See Dade County v. Palmer & Baker
Eng'rs, Inc., 339 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1965). But see Peters, supra note 35, at 274 (§ 2-708(2)
offers no guidance for loss contract). A crafty plaintiff may avoid the consequences of a
losing bargain by suing for restitution rather than on the contract. See, e.g., Acme Pro-
cess Equip. Co. v. United States, 347 F.2d 509 (Ct. Cl. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 385
U.S. 138 (1966); Childres & Garamella, The Law of Restitution and the Reliance Interest
in Contract, 4 Nw. U.L. Rrv. 433 (1969); Nordstrom, Restitution on Default and Article
Two of the Uniform Commercial Code, 19 VAND. L. Ray. 1143 (1966).
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tions of purpose and efficiency in contract remedies. If the purpose of
contract remedies is compensation for loss caused by, rather than pun-
ishment for, breach, economic cost theory provides a more exact mea-
surement of that loss.91 In the Spartin case, for example, it undercuts
the assumption of some courts and commentators that the reallocation
of overhead to other units of work will necessarily decrease overall
profitability. Unless deterrence of breach through overcompensation is
adopted as an explicit policy objective, the search for greater accuracy
in measuring actual loss should not, by itself, be a cause for alarm. If
greater accuracy demonstrates less loss than had previously been thought
to occur, the value in encouraging economic efficiency through the
breaching buyer's reallocation of resources is not necessarily outweighed
by considerations of fairness to the seller.92
If, however, economic analysis increases the cost and difficulty of
proving losses which in fact were caused by the breach, a problem of
distributive justice is posed. It can be argued with some persuasion that
courts should avoid the particularization required by economic analysis,
and thus interpret UCC section 2-708(2) to support recovery whenever
overhead has reasonably been allocated to a particular contract through
generally accepted accounting principles. Any overcompensation pro-
duced by this rough approximation of loss is justified by the reduction
in the cost and complexity of proof. This argument may be countered
in two ways. First, the impact of requiring the seller to establish the
reasonableness of overhead under economic cost theory can be modified
by subtle judicial allocations of the burden of coming forward with
particular evidence93 and by a purposeful use of the notion that uncer-
tainty in proof of damages caused by the breach should be resolved
against the breacher.94 Second, as more sellers use economic cost theory
for planning purposes and as more empirically estimated cost curves
91 See, e.g., Leonard, The Measurement of Damages: An Economist's View, 31 Osno
ST. L.J. 687 (1970); Nordstrom, Toward a Law of Damages, 18 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 86,
101-02 (1966).
92 Harris has argued that "there is no abstract guiding principle of contract damage
measurement making deterrence of breach a goal." Harris, supra note 34, at 95. But see
note 6 supra. See also Gorco Constr. Co. v. Stein, 256 Minn. 476, 99 N.W.2d 69 (1959)
(punishment for breach without regard to extent of harm caused is unjust and unnecessary
remedy).
93 See note 41 supra.
94 "The law only requires that some reasonable basis of computation be used,
and will allow damages so computed even if the result reached is only an approxi-
mation ....... The most elementary conceptions of justice and public policy re-
quire that the wrongdoer shall bear the risk of the uncertainty which his own
wrong has created....'
Distribu.-Dor, Inc. v. Karadanis, 11 Cal. App. 3d 463, 470, 90 Cal. Rptr. 231, 236 (3d Dist.
1970), quoting Allen v. Gardner, 126 Cal. App. 2d 335, 340, 272 P.2d 99, 102 (1954).
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become available through increased use of programming techniques,
the process of proof may over time become easier.0 5 In fact, the increased
use of economic cost theory in business and the paucity of litigation in
recent years may suggest that rational sellers, perceiving themselves in
stage III, recognize that they have suffered little loss from breach by the
buyer.
On balance we have concluded that in the absence of a complete
revision of UCG section 2-708(2), 91 the phrase "profit (including reason-
able overhead)" should be interpreted to require the seller to prove
entitlement to overhead under economic cost theory. The main dis-
advantage of this interpretation is that until empirically estimated cost
curves become an integral part of a seller's operations, the increased
complexity of proof may decrease the effectiveness of contract remedies
in this commercial setting. The off-setting advantage of an economic
cost theory interpretation of section 2-708(2) is that it may compel par-
ticular sellers and buyers to negotiate liquidated damage clauses which
are responsive to actual rather than presumed business realities. Section
2-718(1) provides:
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agree-
ment but only at an amount which is reasonable in the light of the
95 Production and cost functions, developed from technical information supplied by
engineers or agrarian scientists, are widely available through new computer techniques
and are used extensively in several sectors of the economy. See Walters, Production and
Cost Function: An Econometric Survey, 31 EcoNoMErsucA 1 (1963). See also Furubotn,
Engineering Data and the Production Function, 55 AM. ECON. Rxv. 512 (1965); Kurz &
Manne, Engineering Estimates of Capital-Labor Substitution in Metal Machinery, 53 Am.
ECON. Rrv. 662 (1963). Use of empirically derived inferences from economic data has be-
come a widespread and important practice in economic analysis. See Fisher, The Existence
of Aggregate Production Functions, 37 ECONOM=nUCA 553 (1969).
96 A revision of § 2-708(2) should include the following changes:
(1) More clarity as to when the "measure of damages provided in subsection (1) is
inadequate to put the seller in as good a position as performance would have done," espe-
cially in cases when the seller under a repudiated contract for the manufacture and sale of
goods reasonably stops work;
(2) More precision in the measurement of lost profit;
(3) A statement that overhead allocated to the contract under generally accepted
accounting principles is recoverable only when the gains prevented by inability to spread
overhead over additional units of production exceed the savings realized in avoiding vari-
able costs;
(4) A statement that the seller shall recover reasonable costs of performance incurred
up to the time of breach, adjusted for savings realized from reallocation of materials or
labor to other work or the proceeds of any salvage or scrap resale;
(5) A statement that any overhead or reasonable performance costs otherwise recover-
able shall be reduced in proper proportion to any loss that the seller would have suffered
upon full performance of the contract.
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anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach, the difficulties of
proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise
obtaining an adequate remedy. A term fixing unreasonably large
liquidated damages is void as a penalty.
The scope and effectiveness of this provision are not yet entirely clear.0 7
Nevertheless, if the seller's cost data and the impact of breach are un-
certain, and the parties negotiate, say, a formula for the proration of
overhead based upon the stage of performance at breach 8 or a fixed
amount for net profit prevented "which is reasonable in the light of the
anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach," the agreed remedy
should stand up in ensuing litigation. There have been some indications
that courts are more receptive to negotiated remedies under circum-
stances where high transaction costs impair remedial effectiveness.00
Thus the period of transition from the prevailing legal analysis to eco-
nomic cost theory could be bridged by the use of particularized liqui-
dated damage clauses which reduce the complexity of proof and make
more certain the price to be paid by the buyer for breach of contract.
Increased judicial receptiveness to liquidated damage clauses in these
circumstances can reinforce the purpose and efficiency of contract reme-
dies and facilitate the search for more exact methods of measuring
actual loss.
07 Peters has suggested that § 2-718(1) is "not likely to be of much comfort to the
seller," although "no more than reasonable correspondence between stipulated amount
and actual or anticipated injury" is required. Peters, supra note 35, at 278. The case
law under § 2-718 is sparse and inconclusive. See Denkin v. Sterner, 10 Pa. D. & C.2d 203
(York County C.P. 1956) (agreement permitting seller to recover price upon repudiation
by buyer held penalty absent evidence as to condition or status of goods or resale market);
Northwestern Motor Car, Inc. v. Pope, 51 Wis. 2d 292, 187 N.W.2d 200 (1971) (liquidated
damage clause invoked by new car dealer presumptively valid and not subject to demur-
rer). For discussion of pre-Code case law, see Macneil, Power of Contract and Agreed
Remedies, 47 Coaurmr L.Q. 495, 499-513 (1962); Sweet, Liquidated Damages in California,
60 CALIF. L. R-v. 84, 106-09 (1972).
08 See Challenge-Cook Bros. v. Lantz, 256 Cal. App. 2d 536, 64 Cal. Rptr. 239 (Ist Dist.
1967) (overhead based upon percentage of contract price); note 58 supra. But see Gorco
Constr. Co. v. Stein, 256 Minn. 476, 99 N.W.2d 69 (1959) (effort to liquidate overhead
recovery unenforceable since item subject to ready proof and no evidence offered of reason-
able relation to actual loss).
09 E.g., Broderick Wood Prods. Co. v. United States, 195 F.2d 43, 438 (10th Cir. 1952)
(tendency of clause is to promote performance and amicably adjust in advance matters
which if settled in courts would often involve difficulty, uncertainty, delay, and expense);
Knutton v. Cofield, 273 N.C. 355, 160 S.E.2d 29 (1968) (clause regarded as liquidated dam-
ages rather than penalty enforceable even though "no actual damages are suffered'). Com-
mentators also favor expanded use of negotiated damage clauses between professionals.
See Dunbar, Drafting the Liquidated Damage Clause-When and How, 20 OHIo ST. L.J.
221, 231-32, 234-35 (1959); Mueller, supra note 9, at 838; Sweet, supra note 97, at 85-90, 144.
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APPENDIX
STATISTICAL ESTIMATION OF COST FUNCTIONS
Cost functions expressing cost as a function of output can be empirically
estimated from periodic cost and output data for a seller. The data in table
A are actual data collected from a Virginia industry and are assumed to be
Spartin's cost data. Although similar data collected from a single seller
should have less variability than industry data and would be preferable,
industry data are useful here for illustrative purposes.
TABLE A
HISToRICAL CoST AND OUTPUT DATA
Year Total Sales Total Cost
1953 $112,000 $ 95,000
1954 153,000 114,000
1955 174,000 139,000
1956 186,000 147,000
1957 225,000 162,000
1958 246,000 172,000
1959 277,000 214,000
1960 302,000 223,000
1961 341,000 242,000
1962 387,000 271,000
1963 405,000 302,000
1964 439,000 316,000
1965 471,000 341,000
1966 531,000 398,000
1967 587,000 467,000
1968 600,000 473,000
The shape of the cost functions is reflected by the degree of the equation
which expresses the cost relationships of the seller and the coefficients of the
variables in the equation. The shape of the average variable cost and aver-
age total cost functions for a particular seller will be useful in this analysis
because they indicate the level of output at which the minimum average
variable cost is obtained, the beginning of stage II, and the level of output
at which average total cost begins to increase, the beginning of stage III.
A. Statistical Model
Average cost functions will have the typical U-shape shown in figure 1
when the total cost equation is a third degree polynomial. It is hypothesized
that a third degree total cost equation will explain the variation in total
cost with respect to the different levels of output for Spartin's periodic data
in table A. The statistical significance (or economic importance) of the
estimated coefficients for this model will test the correctness of this hy-
pothesis.
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1. First Equation
Assuming least squares multiple regression analysis 00 is the appropriate
statistical method to be employed to explain the variation of cost for the
different levels of output, the model to be used becomes:
TC = bo + b1V + b2 V2 + b3 V3
where
TC = total cost
V, V2,V3  = linear, quadratic, and cubic effects of dollar volume of
output on total cost
b0 = the fixed cost
bl, b2, b3 = the effect on total cost of a one unit change in VV2,V3
respectively
Basically, least squares multiple regression analysis will fit a total cost
curve to the periodic data in such a fashion that the sums of squares owing
to error will be minimized. This statistical technique permits the estimation
of the coefficient of multiple determination, the R2 statistic, which indicates
the extent to which the variables included in the model explain the total
variation in cost. The R 2 statistic can be tested for statistical significance'O1
to indicate the extent to which variations in the dependent variable (cost)
are related to variations in the independent variables (volume).
Least squares analysis provides estimates of the b0, bl, b2 and b3 para-
meters which can be tested for statistical significance (or economic impor-
tance) and thereby used to determine whether the hypothesized model is
the appropriate model to explain the variations in cost. Confidence inter-
vals' 02 around the estimates of each of the coefficients not only indicate the
range within which the actual cost of producing a given level of output may
vary because of error not explained by the variables in the model, but also
indicate the authoritativeness of the cost estimate and determine the out-
side limits to remedial considerations.
100 An introduction to the least squares method is contained in 1 J. LI, STATIS"ICAL
INFERENcE 279 (1964). A more useful discussion for purposes of this study is contained in
R. ANDERSON & T. BANCROFr, STATIsTICAL THEORY IN RESEARCH 158 (1952); J. JOHNSTON,
ECONOMETRIC METHODS 3 (1963).
101 The word "significance" has a technical meaning in statistics. In general, it is used
in connection with the rejection of a hypothesis. The meaning of the word significance
depends on the hypothesis tested. J. JOHNSTON, supra note 100, at 22; 1 J. Li, supra note
100, at 210. In this analysis, "significant" and "highly significant" refer to statistical signifi-
cance at the five percent and one percent levels of statistical significance respectively for
the student's t test. Student's t tests of statistical significance are discussed in J. JOHNSTON,
supra note 100, at 115; 1 J. Li, supra note 100, at 146.
102 Confidence intervals reflect the degree of confidence that the estimated coefficient
would be the true coefficient if the entire population were known. Confidence intervals
show the confidence that one can justifiably have that the actual value is between the
upper and lower confidence limits. R. ANDERSON & T. BANCROFr, supra note 100, at 282; J.
JOHNSTON, supra note 100, at 115; 1 J. Li, supra note 100, at 158.
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B. Regression Results
1. Second Equation
The total cost equation estimated by the model in the first equation
is as follows:
TC = 50,000 + 0.6V - (0.25 X 10-6)V2 + (0.7 X 10-2)V3
This regression equation explained 97.8% of the variation of the total cost
data. The coefficient of multiple determination is highly significant indicat-
ing that there is a relationship between the dependent variable and the inde-
pendent variables. This equation leaves only 2.2% of the variation of cost
unexplained by the variables chosen.
The student's t test103 indicated that the bo and b, coefficients were highly
significant. The coefficient of b2 was negative and not significant. The coeffi-
cient of b3 was positive and not significant. Although the estimates of the
coefficients for the V2 and V3 variables were not statistically significant, they
are economically important and should be included in the total cost equa-
tion.104
2. Third Equation
Given the total cost equation for Spartin in the second equation the
average variable cost equation becomes:
AVC = 0.6 - (0.25 X 10-6)V + (0.7 X 10-12)V 2
3. Fourth Equation
The average cost equation derived is:
AC - $50,000 + 0.6 - (0.25 X 10-6)V + (0.7 X 10-12)V 2
The remedial significance of these cost equations is fully discussed in the text.
103 See note 101 supra.
104 A paradoxical situation frequently arises in testing the significance of the partial
regression coefficients when the independent variables are highly correlated. The regres-
sion sum of squares owing to the combined effect of two variables may be significant al-
though the additional sum of squares owing to either of the variables alone is not signifi-
cant. When this happens it is important to realize that a partial regression coefficient is
the total regression coefficient of the dependent variable on an adjusted independent vari-
able. The non-significance of both additional sums of squares indicates that if one indepen-
dent variable is included in the regression equation the other is no longer needed to predict
the dependent variable. This does not mean that neither of them is necessary. See 2 J. L,
supra note 100, at 110.
To handle this situation, there are several alternatives. When estimating the coefficients
for cost functions, arguably the appropriate alternative is to include both variables when
the estimated coefficients have the correct signs to give the cost equation the hypothesized
U-shape. Although not statistically significant, the coefficients have important economic
implications when applied to a particular firm.
